Allied forces. The postwar Western democracy was to be safeguarded by an ever-expanding prosperous middle class, for, as Barrington Moore decisively put it, crediting Marx with the insight: 'No bourgeois, no democracy' (Moore 1966: 418) .
2 Western prosperity as a fundamentally political project was underwritten by an international system of relatively open trade (increasingly so after the Kennedy Round of the 1960s) and exchange rate stability, supported at home by the appropriate mix of growth-directed economic policies seeking to bring about the Rostovian 'take-off' into sustained prosperity (Rostow 1960) . This indicated a strategic American interest in the economic expansion of Western countries, which the US also saw as creating larger markets for its products rather than as increased competition for its exports. The US hegemonic role in that positive-sum liberal order entailed not only an American responsibility to support the Bretton Woods regime and world economic growth through its own balance-of-payments deficits. It also involved the power to promote US national interests by inducing political compliance and suppressing beggar-thy-neighbor tendencies toward destabilizing economic nationalism (Cohen 1977: 97; Kindleberger 1981; Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1987: 131ff) .
Economic growth became the new universal creed to which governments very soon began to conform. In the early 1950s the annual reports of the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) stressed the need to improve productivity as the key to expansion; in 1956 the term 'economic growth' was introduced for the first time. When the organization was renamed the OECD in 1960, article 1 of its charter stated the objective of achieving 'the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living' for its member countries (Mazower 1998: 301) .
One will find the principal sources of Greece's policy course as of the early 1950s: in the developmentalist orthodoxy of the time that privileged at least some degree of reliance on ISI; in the subjection to US hegemony promoting macroeconomic discipline and a relatively open trade orientation (even if still lukewarmly so); and in the 'objective' necessity of adopting a monetary policy that would protect the drachma from inflationary pressures so that the exchange rate, fixed in the Bretton Woods system, would remain competitive without crippling the country's exports. And then one should look at the domestic sociopolitical life filtering external pressures, and also seek to identify the broader contextual factors of the leading international 'success stories' and policy paradigms on which policymakers could draw. One should also examine those policymakers' own ideological and technocratic dispositions, and
